www.erasmusinbraganca.fora.pl

zngmqk29

Likewise, Borkenau was often highly critical of the work of the pro-Soviet British historian E. H. Carr. In 1951,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych] Borkenau wrote in the Der Monat newspaper of the first volume of Carr's History of Soviet Russia that for Carr: "Human suffering he seems to say, is not a historical factor; Carr belongs to those very cold people who always believe they think and act with the iciest calculation and therefore fail to understand why they are mistaken in their calculations time and time again".[11] Borkenau was a leading advocate for the Totalitarianism school. Another historian whom Borkenau disliked (but for different reasons than was the case with Deutscher and Carr) was Arnold J. Toynbee. In the May 1955 issue of Commentary, Borkenau accused Toynbee of being anti-Semitic.[12]
In the 1950s,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych], Borkenau was well-known as an expert on Communism and the Soviet Union. Borkenau was one of the founders of Sovietology. As a Kremlinologist, one of Borkenau's major interests was making predictions about the future of the Communist world.[13] Some of Borkenau's predictions, such as his claim in the early 1950s about the coming Sino-Soviet split were confirmed by events,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych] but others were not.[13] In an article in the April 1954 edition of Commentary entitled "Getting at the Facts Behind the Soviet Facade", Borkenau wrote that the Sino-Soviet alliance was highly unstable, and would last at a minimum for only a decade or so.[14]
Borkenau argued that the key to understanding Soviet politics was that under the Soviet regime's surface of unity lay fierce power struggles within the Soviet elite.[15] Moreover, Borkenau contended that within the Soviet government there were vast chefstvo (patronage) networks extending down from the elite to the lowest levels of power.[16]
Borkenau’s techniques were a minute analysis of official Soviet statements and the standing arrangement at the Kremlin on official occasions to determine what Soviet leader was in Joseph Stalin's favor and what leader was not.[16] In Borkenau's opinion, signs such as newspaper editorials, guest lists at formal occasions, obituaries in Soviet newspapers, and accounts of formal speeches were the key to finding out and identifying the standing of the various chefstvo networks.[16]Borkenau argued that even small changes in the formulistic language of the Soviet state could sometimes indicate important changes.[16] Borkenau wrote that: "Political issues must be interpreted in the light of formulas,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych] political and otherwise, and their history; and such interpretation cannot be safely concluded until the whole history of the given formula has been established from its first enunciation on".